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ABSTRACT
Like other recent studies, we find the existence of a political deficit cycle in a large cross-section
of countries. However, we find that this result is driven by the experience of "new democracies".
The strong budget cycle in those countries accounts for the finding of a budget cycle in larger
samples that include these countries; when these countries are removed from the larger sample, so
that only "established" democracies remain, the political budget cycle disappears. The political
deficit cycle in new democracies accounts for findings in both developed and less developed
economies, for the finding that the cycle is stronger in weaker democracies, and for differences in
the political cycle across governmental and electoral systems. Our findings may reconcile two
contradictory views of pre-electoral manipulation, one arguing it is a useful instrument to gain voter
















A common perception is that incumbents often try to use expansionary economic 
policy before elections to increase their re-election chances.  Most politicians and non-
politicians alike would probably subscribe to this view, and the term “election-year 
economics” or its equivalent is common in many countries.
1  
In the political economy literature, this view is summarized as the “political 
business cycle”, that is, the possibility of a macroeconomic cycle induced by the political 
cycle.  Models of the political business cycle are motivated by the finding that good 
macroeconomic conditions prior to the elections help an incumbent to get re-elected, a 
finding that has wide support in studies (conducted mainly in developed economies).
2  
The strength of this finding was an important factor generating formal modeling of how 
opportunistic incumbents may manipulate economic policy to induce economic 
expansions before elections.    
However, notwithstanding both common perceptions and the substantial evidence 
that a “strong economy” helps incumbents get re-elected, empirical studies – especially in 
developed economies – provide little evidence of a regular and statistically significant 
increase in economic activity before elections.
3   In short, voters care about the economy 
but this does not appear to translate into econometrically verifiable cycles in aggregate 
economic activity.   
Given the lack of empirical evidence for political cycles in economic outcomes, a 
literature examining possible cycles in policy instruments has developed.  More 
                                                 
1 Tufte (1978, p.3) begins his famous book on the political business cycle with a quote from 1814, 
“A Government is not supported a hundredth part so much by the constant, uniform, quiet 
prosperity of the country as by those damned spurts which Pitt ]used to have just in the nick of 
time.” 
2 The most influential work is probably that of Fair (1978, 1982, 1988), who found such results 
for the U.S.  In his original article, Fair looked at presidential elections from 1916 through 1976, 
and found that the change in real economic activity in the year of the election appears to have an 
important effect on votes for president.  Specifically, a one percent increase in the growth rate 
increases the incumbent’s vote total by about one percent.  Numerous other articles find similar 
results on the importance of pre-election conditions on voting patterns in both the U.S. and other 
countries.  Looking at voting or popularity functions, Lewis-Beck (1988) found that the sort of 
results that Fair reports for the U.S. hold in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Spain as 
well. Madsen (1980) reported similar results for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 
3 See Drazen (2000), chapter 7, for a review of the empirical evidence on opportunistic political 
business cycles in economic activity.   2
specifically, the focus is on fiscal expansions in election years meant to generate the 
desired electoral effects, termed the “political budget cycle”.  Conventional wisdom, 
supported by the findings of a number of econometric studies using large cross-country 
data sets, is that the political budget cycle is a widespread phenomenon, a result that we 
find as well.  (We discuss these papers in greater detail in section 3 below).   
A very different view casts doubt on the widespread existence of political cycles 
in macroeconomic policy.  While it is agreed that a “strong economy” helps incumbent's 
re-election prospects, it is argued that politicians have very limited ability to successfully 
manipulate the economy to help their re-election chances.  There are at least two reasons 
to question whether politicians will engage in pre-electoral monetary and fiscal expansion 
in order to manipulate aggregate economic activity.  First, there is the technical question 
of whether it is possible to time the expansion accurately enough to happen just before 
the elections.  Though high precision missiles may now dominate military conflict, the 
economic equivalent in electoral conflict is believed not to exist.  It is impossible to fine-
tune the aggregate economic effects of economic policy so that they can be turned on and 
off with sufficient precision.
4  
Even if it were technically possible to time precisely the aggregate effects of 
policy, manipulating economic activity is considered harmful to the economy over time 
in terms of “unsmoothing” consumption, inducing investment cycles, etc.  If voters are 
rational and well informed they would not support such policies, so that pre-electoral 
manipulation would be punished rather than rewarded at the polls.  This is argued in a 
number of papers, such as Peltzman (1992), Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), and 
Brender (2003), which present evidence that voters in developed economies are “fiscal 
conservatives” and often tend to remove deficit-producing incumbents from office.  
The lack of an aggregate fiscal cycle, and particularly avoiding deficits before 
elections, does not mean that incumbents do not use fiscal policy to influence voting.  
Fiscal manipulation may occur at a level other than the aggregate, for example, transfers 
to one group offset by a reduction in transfers to other groups of voters or in changes in 
the composition of spending towards spending valued by “impressionable” voters.  This 
would allow fiscal manipulation to work, but would be consistent with voters being fiscal 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Lewis-Beck (1988).    3
conservatives who dislike the need to finance higher aggregate spending.  Provided that 
the overall budgetary change is small enough, it would also be consistent with it being 
harder to detect fiscal manipulation.   
  In this paper we find a political budget cycle in a large cross-section of countries, 
but argue that this finding is driven by the experience of “new democracies”, where fiscal 
manipulation may work because voters are inexperienced with electoral politics or may 
simply lack the information needed to evaluate fiscal manipulation that is produced in 
more established democracies.  It is the strong fiscal cycle in these countries that 
accounts for the finding of a fiscal cycle in larger samples including these countries.  
Once these countries are removed from the larger sample, the political fiscal cycle 
disappears.  The political cycle in new democracies accounts for findings in both 
developed and less developed economies, for the finding that the cycle is stronger in 
weaker democracies, and for differences in the political cycle across government or 
electoral systems.  
Our findings also reconcile the two contradictory views of pre-electoral 
manipulation set out above: one that it is reasonable to expect politicians to engage in 
such manipulation and that empirically it is widespread; the other, that voters punish 
rather than reward fiscal manipulation.  In new democracies it is possible to carry out 
such manipulation, whereas in more established democracies, voters have the ability to 
identify fiscal manipulation and punish such behavior, so that politicians avoid it.    
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we summarize the existing 
evidence for a political budget cycle.  This includes earlier evidence for the political 
fiscal cycle, mostly from less-developed countries, as well as more recent papers arguing 
that a cycle is observed in both less-developed and developed countries.  In section 3, we 
set up the basic empirical work, discuss a number of data and estimation issues, and 
present the basic regressions for the set of democracies as a whole.  In section 4, the heart 
of the paper, we demonstrate that the political budget cycle found in larger data sets is 
due to the significant political cycle in “new democracies”.  In section 5, we consider 
some arguments on observable characteristics of countries that may account for the cycle 
and argue that these too are new democracy effects.  In section 6, we discuss   4
conceptually why the political budget cycle is a phenomenon of “new democracies”.  
Section 7 concludes.  A Data Appendix contains a detailed description of the data. 
  
2. Evidence on Fiscal Cycles – A Summary  
For less-developed countries, there are a large number of both country and cross-
country studies that point to the existence of a political budget cycle.  Ames (1987) 
presents a panel study of 17 Latin American countries in which he shows that over the 
period 1947-1982, government expenditures increased by 6.3% in the pre-election year 
and decreased by 7.6% in the year after the election.  Block (2000) presents evidence of a 
political business cycle in both fiscal and monetary policy in a cross-section of 44 Sub-
Saharan African countries.  Schuknecht (1996) is a comprehensive study of the political 
business cycle in 35 less-developed countries over the period 1970-92.
5  He argues that 
there is more room for manipulation in LDCs, as checks and balances are weaker and the 
incumbent has more power over monetary and fiscal policy.  He suggests that in LDCs, 
expenditure policies, such as distribution of free or subsidized goods or employment 
generation via public works programs, are probably more effective than tax cuts to affect 
voter behavior.  He finds a clear significant effect of elections on the fiscal balance, but 
no significant effect on output.  Individual country studies arguing for a significant 
political fiscal cycle include Ben-Porath (1975) for Israel over the period 1952-73, 
Krueger and Turan (1993) for Turkey over the period 1950-1980, and Gonzàlez (2002) 
for Mexico over the period 1958-1997, to name a few.  Drazen (2001) presents further 
discussion.  
For developed countries, fiscal manipulation observable at the aggregate level is 
thought to be less common.  Individual country studies generally do not find a regular, 
statistically significant political budget cycle.  Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) find a 
budget balance cycle in a set of 13 OECD economies over the period 1960-1993 (about 
half of the countries have observations only from 1970 onward), but no significant cycle 
in the components of the budget.  In the United States, Keech and Pak (1989) found a 
cycle for veteran benefits in the United States between 1961 and 1978.  Consistent with 
the findings of Keech and Pak, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) find evidence of a 
                                                 
5 See also Block (2002) for a recent cross-section study.   5
political cycle in transfers relative to GNP in the U.S. over 1961 to 1985, which they 
argue disappears if one extends the sample either forward or backward.  They find no 
statistically significant political cycle in other fiscal instruments.
6  
Two recent studies find evidence that the political budget cycle is present in both 
developed and less-developed countries.  Shi and Svensson (2002a, 2002b) consider a 
panel data set of 91 countries, both democracies and non-democracies, over the period 
1975-95. They find that, in an election year, the government surplus falls significantly in 
both less-developed and developed countries, though they show that the effect is far 
stronger in less-developed countries, consistent with earlier studies.  Both government 
spending rises and revenues fall, though the significance differs across the data sets and 
the estimation technique.  The economic effect is significant for the sample as a whole, 
the fiscal surplus falling on average in their full sample by 1/2 to 1 percent in an election 
year, depending on the estimation method they use. 
Persson and Tabellini (2002, see also Persson and Tabellini [2003, chapter 8]) 
argue that there is a strong political budget cycle in developed economies as well.  They 
restrict the sample to countries with democratic political institutions and competitive 
elections and consider a group of sixty democracies from 1960 to 1998.  They find a 
political revenue cycle (government revenues as a percent of GDP decrease before 
elections), but no political cycle in expenditures, transfers, or the overall budget balance 
across countries or political systems.   
 
3. Estimating Political Budget Cycles in Democracies  
  As is well known, the IFS data on which many studies are based are noisy.  
Therefore, as a first step in our empirical work, the data were “cleaned”.  In Table A1 in 
the Appendix, we set out what are the problems with the data on a country-by-country 
basis, and what were the adjustments that we made.  (The data are available at 
http://www.tau.ac.il/~drazen.)  On this basis, we then estimate equations similar to those 
estimated by Persson and Tabellini, using the same economic controls, variable 
                                                 
6 Analyzing U.S. elections for President, Senators, and state governors in the period 1950-1988, 
Peltzman (1992) goes further and argues that voters penalize growth in federal and state spending 
at the polls.  In U.S. state governor’s elections, increases in spending on welfare payments are 
especially heavily punished, as is spending just prior to an election.   6
definitions, and a somewhat extended sample.  Our main conclusion is that in a broad 
cross-section of democracies over the period 1960-2001 there indeed exists a political 
cycle in the fiscal balance, though the strength of the cycle is sensitive to the set of 
countries included.  In section 4 we will refine this further, and show that the crucial 
country characteristic is whether the country is a “new” or an established democracy.  
Our basic data set consists of 106 countries for which we collect data on the 
central government balance, total expenditure and total revenue and grants from the IFS 
database. (Further details are given in the Data Appendix and Tables A1 and A2.)  The 
sample period is 1960-2001, although the data for many countries cover shorter periods.  
Our initial sample includes many countries that are not democracies.  In our view, 
if the political budget cycle reflects the manipulation of fiscal policy to improve an 
incumbent’s re-election chances, then it only makes sense in countries in which elections 
are competitive.  If elections are not competitive, then the basic argument underlying the 
existence of a political budget cycle loses much of its validity.
7  In fact, one might argue 
that finding a political budget cycle in non-democratic countries weakens the support for 
the theory, rather than strengthening it. Hence, from either an empirical or conceptual 
perspective, one needs to separate democratic from non-democratic countries.
8  
We therefore separate democracies from non-democracies, analogous to Persson 
and Tabellini, by applying to these data a filter for the level of democracy in each country 
in each year.  This filter is taken from the POLITY IV project, conducted at the 
University of Maryland, covering nations with a population exceeding half a million 
people.  Each country is assigned in this dataset a value that ranges from -10 (autocracy) 
to 10 (the highest level of democracy).  We restrict our sample to democracies, by 
selecting only the countries that receive a score between 0 and 10 on this scale; this 
reduces our sample to 68 countries.  These countries may be classified as those that were 
in the OECD for the entire sample period, the “transition” economies of Eastern Europe 
                                                 
7 Shi and Svensson argue that the desire of dictators to eliminate signs of discontent even before 
“sham” elections may account for increases in spending and deficits in non-democracies that they 
report. Alternative explanations of pre-election fiscal expansions that might be observed under 
both competitive and non-competitive electoral systems would include multi-year economic plans 
which coincide with the term of governments or “end of term” budgeting effects. 
8 It is too simple to argue that including non-democratic countries in the sample simply lowers the 
probability of finding significant results.  The model should be tested separately for democracies 
and other countries.   7
and the former Soviet Union (for the period 1990-2001), and all others.  Tables A1 and 
A2 provide a list, as well as a description of the available data for each country.
9   
An important feature of the data is that the number of countries in the sample is 
increasing over time.  This feature reflects not only the expanded coverage of the IFS, but 
also an increase in the number of democracies.  Using the POLITY filter to identify 
democracies, we find that there are 31 democracies in the sample in the 1960s; 44 in the 
1970s, 53 in the 1980s, and 59 in the 1990s, not counting the formerly socialist 
economies.  If the transition economies are included the number of democracies rises to 
69 in the 1990s, more than twice the number in the 1960s.  More specifically, new 
democracies are being added to each of the samples over time.   
The basic regression is of the form:  
t i i t t i k t i
k
k t i ε ELEC f f , , , , µ d b + + + ′ + = ∑ ∑ − x c     (1) 
where  t i f ,  is a fiscal indicator in country i in year t, xi,t is a vector of control variables, 
ELECt is an electoral dummy, and  i µ  is a country fixed effect.  (Year effects were 
generally insignificant and were dropped from the regressions.
10) In the tables, we present 
only the coefficient of the electoral variable, indicating whether or not there is a 
statistically significant political cycle.   
In addition to fixed country effects, our control variables are those used by 
Persson and Tabellini, which encompass those commonly used in the literature.  These 
include real GDP per capita taken from the 2002 version of the World Bank's World 
development Indicators dataset (WDI)), the trade share, two demographic variables 
representing the fraction of the population aged 15-64 and 65+ (also taken from WDI), 
and the log difference between real GDP and its (country specific) trend (computed using 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter), as a measure of the output gap.   
The electoral dummy, meant to capture pre-electoral effects, is that used by these 
authors. It equals 1 in an election year and 0 otherwise, no matter when during the year 
                                                 
9 Table A3 lists countries that were excluded, either because: IFS data doesn't exist, even though 
some other studies include these countries; IFS data exist, but they were not democracies; or, 
because, though the country is democratic, we judged the IFS data to be of very low quality. 
10 The insignificance of the year effects may be due to the inclusion of controls for the level of 
economic activity in each country in each year.   8
the election occurred.
11  However, we adjust the electoral year definition to be consistent 
with the fiscal year, when fiscal data are reported for a fiscal year different than the 
calendar year.  Election dates and institutional data on the election process are taken from 
the DPI dataset, provided by the World Bank (Beck et. al., [2001], Keefer [2002]).  These 
data were complemented, where needed, by other political datasets, such as the IDEA 
(Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter Turnout Since 1945 to Date”) 
and IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, election guide).  
Using country fixed effects in an OLS regression with lagged dependent variables 
introduces a potential estimation bias that is of order 1/T, where T is the length of the 
panel.  (See, for example, Nickell [1981] or Wooldridge [2002].)  The bias arises because 
the initial condition  0 , i f  is correlated with the country fixed effect  i µ , so that the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term.  This problem is thought to be 
especially severe in micro panel data, where the number of individuals i is large, while T 
is quite small, often less than half-a-dozen.  Since the potential bias of the fixed effects 
estimator is of order 1/T, the magnitude of the bias in our estimates reported below 
depends on which sample and fiscal indicator we use.  In a panel of all democracies from 
1960-2001, the average length of the sample is 24 years in the whole sample, 34 years in 
the developed country subsample, and 18 years for less-developed country subsample.  
(Remember that some countries do not have data for the entire period.)  The average 
length of the time series in our panel of “old” democracies is longer – 35 years, with few 
countries having a time series shorter than the maximum.  Hence, the bias from using a 
fixed effects estimator in these regressions is likely to be small.   
The potential bias may be greater in the panel of elections in “new democracies”, 
since by definition the sample length is much shorter (12 years including transition 
economies, 13 years excluding them).  To address this problem we also present GMM 
estimates for the subsample of new democracies, using the Arellano-Bond procedure.
12   
In the first column of Table 1, we present fixed-effects regressions for the fiscal 
balance, revenues and expenditures, all as a percentage of GDP.  We present only the 
                                                 
11 See Table 9 and the associated discussion for the effect of splitting the electoral dummy into 
elections that occurred in the first half of the year and those that occurred in the second half of the 
year.  We consider the endogeneity of election dates in section 5 below. 
12 Wooldridge (2002) discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the two methods.   9
coefficient on the electoral variable, indicating the presence or absence of a political 
cycle.  We find a highly significant political cycle in the fiscal balance, with the deficit 
rising in an election year by about three-tenths of one percent of GDP relative to non-
election years.
13,14   
 
4. The Empirical Importance of Being a New Democracy 
As mentioned above, the number of democracies in the sample increased 
substantially as more countries, both developed and less-developed, became democracies.  
Whether a country is a new or established democracy may have a significant effect on the 
likelihood that incumbents would use pre-electoral fiscal manipulation to increase the 
probability of their re-election.  Many models arguing that voters hold incumbents 
accountable for deficits and wasteful spending would predict that incumbents who value 
office would cut rather than increase spending, especially in developed economies, where 
government expenditure is high relative to GDP.  (See Peltzman (1992) Besley and Case 
(1995), Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), among others.)  For this to be the case, one 
would require, however, that voters have both the necessary information to draw such 
inferences, as well as the ability to process that information correctly.  These would 
reflect experience with the electoral process by voters, the establishment of the 
institutions that would collect and provide the relevant data, and experience by media in 
disseminating and analyzing this information.  In the absence of this experience, it is 
more likely that fiscal manipulation would be rewarded rather than punished, so that 
incumbents would engage in it.  We will return to these arguments in more detail in 
section 5 below.  
Another reason why the interpretation of economic data by voters may be more 
complicated in new democracies is the shift in economic structure that often goes along 
                                                 
13 The qualitative results in these and all other regressions do not significantly change when the 
White Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance correction is used to calculate standard errors.   
14 These results correspond to those found in studies such as Shi and Svensson (2002a, 
2002b), who considered a cross-section of both democracies and non-democracies over the 
period 1975-95.  When we used a sample without a democracy filter over the same twenty year 
period with their control variables, we found a significant coefficient of -.632 with an FE 
estimator, insignificantly different from their coefficient of -.49.  When we ran their regression 
over the entire sample period using only democracies, the coefficient was -.325.   10
with the shift to democracy.  This is perhaps most striking when one considers the 
formerly socialist economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union where the 
centrally planned economic system and the reporting mechanisms were abolished in a 
relatively short period.  The collapse of old economic systems may also present a 
problem in the analysis of the political fiscal cycle in these countries: to the extent that 
high deficits associated with the economic transition occur simultaneously with the 
political transition, without either one causing the other, one would not classify this as a 
classic political fiscal cycle.  On the other hand, politicians facing the new phenomenon 
of contested elections who are aware of the desire for rapid economic transition may 
respond especially strongly with deficit spending.
15     
To test this hypothesis that political budget cycles are more prevalent in “new 
democracies”, we separate them from established democracies in our sample.  Using the 
POLITY filter, we separate those countries that had competitive elections during the 
entire sample period for which we have data from those that began having competitive 
elections only within the sample period.  For the latter, we take observations for the first 
four competitive elections and define those observations as coming from a “new 
democracy”.
16  In Table A2, we list those observations characterized as “new 
democracies” in both the sample of developed and less developed countries.  Table A4 
provides a breakdown of all the elections in our sample according to the various country 
classifications.  
In the second and third columns of Table 1, we present results over only new 
democracies in the sample both including and excluding the new democracies in Eastern 
Europe (columns 2 and 3, respectively).  The fourth column of the table presents results 
                                                 
15 This suggests that one needs to be careful in how one treats the transition economies in the first 
years after transition, and in how one interprets the results of any study that simply lumps them 
together with other countries. To err on the safe side, we exclude all the elections that took place 
in the first two years following the transition. 
16 An alternative characterization of elections in a new democracy is those elections that occur 
within a specific time period after the country became democratic.  We tried alternative definition 
of all elections in the first 10 years and the first 15 years after becoming democratic.  The results 
(available on request) are very similar, not surprisingly, since generally the same elections are 
being captured.     11
for only old, that is, established, democracies (that is, all countries which were in a 
sample of democracies using the POLITY filter, excluding the new democracies).
17   
Because of the short sample length in the new democracy panels, there is a 
possible bias in using a fixed effects estimator including lagged dependent variables.  In 
table 2 we therefore present GMM estimates of the new democracy regressions, using the 
methodology of Arellano and Bond (1991).  (In the table, we also present the regressions 
for all and only old democracies for comparison purposes, though the length of the time 
series in these samples implies no significant bias in the fixed effects estimates.)   
A number of results stand out.  First, we find a significant deficit cycle for the set 
of new democracies, whether or not the formerly socialist economies are included.  The 
coefficients on the electoral variable are larger than in the sample of all democracies.  We 
also find, in contrast to all other results presented so far, that there is a significant 
political expenditure cycle in the new democracies (as suggested, for example, by 
Schuknecht [1996]).  Note, moreover, that the coefficients on the fiscal balance and on 
expenditures in the analogous equations are very similar (and of opposite sign), while the 
coefficient on revenues is smaller in absolute value and not significantly different from 
zero.  The deficit cycle in the new democracies appears to be clearly driven by higher 
election-year expenditures.  When the sample includes only established democracies, 
there is no significant deficit cycle, but a significant revenue cycle not present in the 
sample of all democracies.  Revenues fall in an election year, similar to what was found 
by Persson and Tabellini.  
To further test the “new democracy” effect, we run regressions for the sample as a 
whole, that is, both new and old democracies, including separate dummy variables for 
each of the first four elections, a dummy for all elections in old democracies and a 
dummy for all elections after the fourth in “former” new democracies.  The results are 
                                                 
17 There are two ways one may exclude elections in “new democracies” in testing for a political 
cycle in “old” democracies.  One is to exclude all elections (i.e., all observations) that is, to 
exclude those countries that made the transition to democracy in the sample period entirely.  The 
other is to exclude only those election observations which occurred when the democracy was in 
fact “new” (up to the first four elections after the transition to democracy in our definition), but to 
include all other observations for these countries in a sample of elections in old democracies.  As 
we cannot be sure a priori how long the new democratic effect persists (we take four elections as 
a possible minimum), we prefer the first procedure and present results using that procedure.  We 
ran the regressions using the second definition of “old” democracies and found the same results.    12
presented in Table 3.  Each of the four new election dummies is significant in regressions 
for a fiscal balance cycle, with approximately equal magnitude, while the coefficients on 
the dummies for elections after the fourth in new democracies and in elections in old 
democracies are not significant.  Moreover, starting with the second election in new 
democracies, the significance of the coefficient drops as one moves to the third and 
fourth elections, suggesting that electoral fiscal effects may be becoming less strong in 
new democracies as there is more experience with elections.  Analogous to our other 
results there is no significant political cycle in revenues or expenditures when separate 
election dummies are used. 
To summarize, the political deficit cycle is a phenomenon of new democracies.  
The finding of a statistically political deficit cycle in a cross-section of all democracies is 
due to the first few elections in countries that are new democracies.  Once these are 
removed from the sample and only elections in established democracies are considered, 
the political deficit cycle as a statistically significant phenomenon in aggregate data 
disappears.  
We should stress that we are not arguing that fiscal manipulation does not occur at 
all in other countries, but only that it is not sufficiently prevalent and large to show up as 
an econometrically significant regularity in the aggregate fiscal deficit for groups of 
countries other than new democracies.  Of course, there may be incidents of aggregate 
fiscal cycles in other countries, as well as fiscal manipulation other than fiscal expansion 
that is not observable in the aggregate fiscal data.  But, in terms of aggregate fiscal 
expansion, it is the new democracies where the political budget cycle is really occurring.  
  
5. Country, Government, and Electoral Characteristics  
Many empirical studies of the political budget cycle across countries argue that 
the strength of cycle depends on a country’s economic or political characteristics.  Such 
arguments include: the level of economic development (see section 2 above), whether 
elections dates are predetermined or not (Shi and Svensson, 2002b), constitutional rules 
determining electoral rules and form of government (Persson and Tabellini, 2002, 2003), 
the “level” of democracy (Shi and Svensson, 2002a, Gonzalez 2002), or other measurable 
factors such as “transparency” or rent-seeking (Shi and Svensson, 2002a, Alt and Lassen,   13
2003).  In this section we consider some of these arguments.  For each of the first four 
arguments, we show that significant finding of a deficit cycle are driven by the 
experience of new democracies.   
 
A. Developed versus Less Developed Countries  
We first consider developed and less developed countries separately.  As already 
indicated, until recently the political budget cycle was thought to be a phenomenon 
largely of less developed countries.  Shi and Svensson found a cycle in both developed 
and less-developed countries, but argued that the cycle was significantly stronger in the 
latter.  
Corresponding roughly to a set of developed countries are members of the OECD 
for the entire sample period.  There are four “new democracies” in the sample period in 
this group – Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey.  While there are not enough data points 
to test for a political fiscal cycle in a sample of only new democracies, we can estimate 
the equations both with and without these four countries.  In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, 
we present results for the political fiscal cycle in OECD countries.  What we find is that 
once the new democracies are removed from the sample, so that the sample contains only 
established democracies, the fiscal balance cycle found in the group of OECD countries 
as a whole disappears.  Similar to what was found for the sample as a whole, there is a 
statistically significant revenue cycle in OECD established democracies.  Hence, as before, the 
political deficit cycle in new democracies is driving the results for the sample of OECD 
countries as a whole. 
In columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Table 4, we consider the political fiscal cycle in less-
developed countries (strictly speaking, countries which were not in the OECD at the 
beginning of the sample period.)  The regressions correspond to all LDC democracies, 
LDC new democracies with both FE and GMM estimation, and LDC old democracies.  
As in the case of developed countries, there is a statistically significant deficit cycle in the 
LDC sample as a whole, but it is due to the new democracies.  We also find that the 
deficit in the new democracies is driven by higher expenditures in election years.  No 
statistically significant political deficit or revenue cycle is found in the subset of 
established LDC democracies.     14
 
B. Pre-determined election dates 
The strength of the political budget cycle may also depend on whether the election date is 
pre-determined or not.  Although one might think that fiscal manipulation in the year of 
an election will be stronger when the election date is exogenously fixed by law, there are 
two conceptual problems with such a simple presumption.  
First, the distinction between electoral systems where the election date is 
exogenously fixed and systems where early elections may be called is not as clear cut as 
it may at first appear.  In many countries fixed election periods are set and early elections 
may only be called under “exceptional circumstances”, but in fact early elections are the 
rule rather than the exception.  That is, what determines “exceptional circumstances” may 
in practice be quite different than what appears to be the case from a simple reading of 
the election laws.  Since almost all countries have some provision for elections at a date 
earlier than the end of the legally mandated term of office for the executive or the 
legislature, whether the elections actually occur at the legally determined date is an 
empirical question.  By the same token, there are countries where the government may 
call early elections, but rarely does.  
Second, we believe that there is no clear theoretical presumption about whether 
fiscal manipulation will be stronger or weaker when election dates are effectively 
predetermined.  When the election date is known well in advance, an opportunistic 
incumbent has ample opportunity to use fiscal policy to help his re-election, far greater, it 
would seem than if there are “snap” elections, with a short lag between elections being 
called and being held.  On the other hand, since incumbents can largely control the timing 
of endogenous elections, there may be more scope for fiscal manipulation.  As argued in 
the introduction, it is extremely difficult to fine tune when policy will have the desired 
effect; the option of early elections with a short campaign period may allow elections to 
be held roughly when the economy looks best
18.  Knowing this, incumbents may be more 
                                                 
18 Heckelman and Berument (1998) find, for example, that election dates in Japan and the U.K. 
are endogenous.    15
tempted to use fiscal policy in the attempt to affect voting behavior.
19  Conversely, 
deterioration in the fiscal situation may create a majority for replacing the government 
and hence lead to a call for early elections.  
One way to address the endogeneity bias from reverse causation or from shocks 
affecting both the election date and the fiscal balance is to separate out those elections 
whose timing is pre-determined.  We do this by looking at the constitutionally determined 
election interval taking as predetermined those elections which were held either at the 
fixed interval or within the expected year of the constitutionally fixed term.  
The results are presented in Table 5. In column1 of the table, we report the results 
for the sample of all democracies using an OLS fixed-effects estimator. We find that the 
coefficient on the electoral variable is similar in size and statistically significant for both 
pre-determined and endogenous election dates. In columns 2 and 3, we restrict the sample 
to only new democracies, using a fixed-effects and a GMM estimator, respectively.  The 
coefficient is significant for both pre-determined and endogenous election dates using 
either method. There is no significant political cycle in established democracies either for 
pre-determined or for endogenous election dates. 
To summarize, we find a deficit political cycle in “new” democracies, but not in 
established democracies, regardless of whether elections were pre-determined or took 
place before their scheduled date.  We also find a significant expenditure cycle in "new" 
democracies for the case of endogenous election dates and a revenue cycle in pre-
determined elections in old democracies.  Taken as a whole, the results suggest that our 
finding that the political budget cycle found in large samples is due to new democracies 
is not caused by the endogeneity of election dates.  
 
C. Constitutional Rules  
Persson and Tabellini (2003) argue that fiscal policy outcomes depend 
significantly on the nature of the government system – whether a country has a 
parliamentary or presidential system of government and whether voting for the legislature 
was primarily via proportional or majoritarian rules.  In a number of papers they consider 
                                                 
19 The view that there is no clear theoretical presumption of the effect in one direction or the other 
is consistent with the results of Shi and Svensson.  They find that the coefficient on the fiscal 
balance was similar across countries with predetermined versus endogenous election dates.    16
the importance of constitutional rules on fiscal policy in general and find significant 
empirical differences in fiscal policy outcomes across systems.  Persson and Tabellini 
(2002, 2003, chapter 8) focus is on differences in political budget cycles across 
government systems and find differences in the cycle across systems.   
Following their differentiation of systems, we considered the difference in the 
political budget cycle across these four categories.  There are in fact differences in the 
deficit cycle across systems when one considers the sample of all democracies.  
However, similar to our earlier results, we find that these differences reflect the 
experience of new democracies.  
The results on differences between presidential and parliamentary systems are 
presented in Table 6, where the classification follows Persson and Tabellini.  We split our 
electoral dummy into two: one for elections in parliamentary systems, the other for 
elections in presidential systems.  In column1 of the table we show that in the sample of 
all democracies, there is a significant deficit cycle in both presidential and parliamentary 
systems.  As before, when we separate new from old democracies, we find that the deficit 
cycle exists only in the former.  Interestingly, the statistically significant revenue cycle 
which we found in some earlier specifications for established democracies is a 
phenomenon of parliamentary established democracies, as we see comparing the 
columns. 
In Table 7 we compare the effect of proportional versus majoritarian voting rules 
on the political budget cycle.  In column1 we show that in the sample of all democracies, 
the deficit cycle is significant only in those countries that use proportional voting rules.  
The coefficient for majoritarian systems is similar, but it is not statistically significant.  
As before, when we separate the sample into new and old democracies, we find a strong 
and significant cycle in new democracies with proportional systems, but no significant 
cycle in the analogous old democracies.  Moreover, we also find that the cycle reflects 
increased expenditures during election years in the new democracies. Hence, we find that 
the electoral rule matters, consistent with Persson and Tabellini’s arguments, but only in 
the group of countries where the fiscal cycle exists to begin with, namely, the new 
democracies.
20  
                                                 
20 We note, however, that our sample includes only 19 majoritarian elections in new democracies.   17
 
D. Level of Democracy 
Another hypothesis is that it is not the length of time a country has been a 
democracy, but the level of democracy that matters for the existence of a political fiscal 
cycle.  That is, the political fiscal cycle may be a phenomenon of countries where 
democracy is relatively weaker.  (See, for example, Shi and Svensson [2002a] and 
Gonzàlez [2002].)   To examine this, we compare the political budget cycle in countries 
with a lower level (“quality”) of democracy to those with a higher level.  Specifically, we 
once again split the electoral dummy into two: Elect-high takes a value 1 in an election 
year if the POLITY value is between 0 and 9 and a value of 0 otherwise; and Elect-low, 
which takes a value 1 in an election year if the POLITY value is 10 and a value of 0 
otherwise.
21    
The results for the sample as a whole and for new and old democracies separately 
are given in Table 8. In the first column, we indeed find that the political budget cycle is 
stronger in countries with a lower level of democracy.  The deficit cycle is significant in 
those countries where the POLITY index of democracy is between 0 and 9, whereas it is 
insignificant in countries with a POLITY index of 10.   
However, once we separate old democracies from new democracies we find that 
the apparent effect of the level of democracy is entirely due to the new democracies.  In 
the second and third columns in Table 8 we show that for new democracies, the deficit 
cycle is significant, regardless of the level of democracy.  In contrast, in the last column, 
where we consider only established democracies, we find that there is no political budget 
cycle, once again regardless of their level of democracy.   
The reason we find stronger evidence for a political budget cycle in the sample of 
all countries when we condition on the level of democracy is probably a composition 
effect. The proportion of new democracies in the group of lower “quality” democracies is 
significantly higher: 50 percent of the data points in that group, compared to 7 percent 
among the countries with a high level of democracy (See also Table A4).  The findings in 
                                                 
21 In some countries the POLITY index changed over time, in which case we split the 
observations for the country between the groups according to the index in each year.   18
Table 8 also rule out the explanation that the results for new democracies actually reflect 
their lower level of democracy, rather than their being “new”. 
 
E. Election Dates 
Following much of the empirical literature, our election dummy was equal to one 
in the year of an election no matter when in the year the election took place.  If the 
election took place late in the year, then the dummy indeed captures mostly the period 
before the election.  However, if the election took place early in the year, then the dummy 
may be capturing, for the most part, post-electoral effects.
22   
One way to address this problem with annual data is to define the dummy as equal 
to one in the year before the election if the election took place in the first half of the year, 
and equal one in the year of the election otherwise.  However, this covers a time period 
so far before the election in the first case (and may still miss the few months nearest to 
the election) that the dummy may also be a poor indicator of pre-electoral effects, 
especially if fiscal manipulation to gain votes is strongest in the months right before an 
election as suggested, for example, by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2003).  Optimally, 
one would like to have high-frequency data if electoral manipulation is short-lived.  
However, since this is not possible in a large cross-section study, these considerations 
suggest that any electoral dummy used with annual data (as must be) might be quite 
“noisy” for cases where elections are held in the first part of the year.  Hence, rather than 
re-defining the electoral dummy as discussed above, we split the dummy into two, one 
for elections held in the first half of the fiscal year, the other for elections held in the 
second half.  
The results of our estimation with the dummies are presented in Table 9.  We find 
that for elections held in the second half, where we believe the variable is less noisy, 
there is a deficit cycle in the sample as a whole that is due to the new democracies.  The 
coefficient estimates are larger than those reported in Table 1.  There is no cycle in old 
                                                 
22 We also tested directly the existence of a post-electoral effect by adding a dummy variable for 
the year after elections. The coefficient was not statistically significant in almost all the equations, 
did not affect the significance of any of our new democracy results, and eliminated the 
significance of the revenue coefficient in the old democracies, except for those with 
parliamentary elections.   19
democracies.  In contrast, for elections held in the first half of the year, there is no 
significant cycle in any sample, which we attribute to the noisiness of the dummy in this 
case.  
 
6. The New Democracy Effect  
  Why are new democracies more susceptible than established democracies to 
election-year economics at the aggregate level?  It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
investigate this question in any depth, though our results, as well as those of others, may 
suggest some avenues of research.   
Whether election-year deficits are rewarded or punished at the polls may depend 
on the availability of information – including the existence of media that would deliver 
such information to voters.  (See, for example, Brender [2003]).  An incumbent might be 
rewarded at the polls only if he can hide the manipulation and make the public believe 
that the good economic conditions reflect the success of his policy or his high ability.  
This assumption seems unreasonable in many countries because voters – especially 
experienced ones (who understand the incentives and the tools of electoral manipulation) 
– know that election years are particularly “suspect” for manipulation and therefore 
would interpret “surprises” in these years with special caution.  Therefore, in economies 
in which the electorate has a lot of experience with elections, and where the collection 
and reporting of the relevant data to evaluate economic policy are common, voters would 
be unlikely to “fall” for the trick of making the economy look good right before elections.  
In contrast, fiscal manipulation may work when voters lack the necessary 
information to draw such inferences, as well as the ability to process that information 
correctly.  This would reflect a lack of experience with an electoral system, of the 
availability of data, and of media experienced in finding, disseminating and analyzing the 
relevant data.  This is more likely to characterize a new democracy.
23  
We want to stress that the ability to draw inferences about incumbent performance 
from pre-electoral economic variables is not meant simply to represent the experience of 
voters, but of experience and interactions of all actors with the electoral system.  Put 
                                                 
23 If “pivotal” voters are harder to identify in a new democracy, then transfers meant to woo 
voters may be spread more widely, implying higher aggregate government deficits.  We are 
indebted to Alessandra Casella for this suggestion.    20
another way, it is not that new democracies are characterized by unsophisticated or naïve 
voting population, but that in countries with less of an electoral history, and hence less 
exposure to pre-electoral fiscal manipulations, a political cycle is more likely to occur.  In 
many new democracies, even basics like the collection of data and reporting it to the 
public are not well established, so that fiscal manipulation is easier to engage in.   (The 
demand for data may in fact be driven in part by the possibility of holding office-holders 
accountable through elections.) 
Some recent papers found evidence consistent with this view in specific countries.  
Brender (2003) shows how the electoral response to deficit spending in local Israeli 
elections changed dramatically over the period 1989 -1998. He found that when direct 
elections for mayors were introduced in Israel, voters were initially indifferent to deficits 
and local fiscal management.  By the 1998 elections, however, when accounting and 
reporting standards were enforced on the local authorities, and when the local media 
expanded, deficit spending was “punished” at the polls.   
A very recent paper by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2003) found similar 
evidence in regional elections in Russia after its transition to democracy.  Using monthly 
data between 1996 and 2003, they found a sizable, but short-lived political budget cycles 
in which large expansions and contractions in local fiscal spending occur in the two 
months before and after elections.  They find that the magnitude of the cycle becomes 
smaller over time and that an additional election in a region reduces the magnitude of the 
cycles by over 30%, so that each new round of regional elections had substantially 
smaller cycles, with the cycle disappearing for most (but not all) fiscal instruments after 
two rounds of elections.   
A number of papers have considered the role of transparency more formally and 
may thus shed further light on one important characteristic of new democracies.  
Gonzàlez (1999) and Shi and Svensson (2002a) extend Rogoff's model to study the effect 
of the degree of democracy and the level of institutions on the magnitude of fiscal cycles.  
Both models stress the importance of “transparency,” which ultimately means the 
probability that voters learn the incumbent's characteristics costlessly, that is, 
independent of signaling.  The higher the degree of transparency, the smaller is the 
political budget cycle.     21
Shi and Svensson further argue that while the proportion of uninformed voters – 
who may be influenced by fiscal manipulation – is initially large, it is likely to decrease 
over time, thus decreasing the magnitude of budget cycles.  They create a measure of the 
availability of information and show that as voters become more informed the magnitude 
of the cycle decreases.
24    
Other papers also find that greater transparency is associated with smaller 
political cycles. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2003) find similarly that measures of the 
freedom of the regional media and the transparency of the regional governments were 
important predictors of the magnitude of the cycle.  Alt and Lassen (2003) find that in 
OECD countries, higher fiscal transparency also lowers the magnitude of the electoral 
cycle.  All these results are consistent with ours if lack of transparency or information, as 
measured by these papers, is an important characteristic of new democracies.   
One should also note an essential difference between some of these arguments 
and ours.  Whereas Shi-Svensson and Gonzàlez, for example, view transparency 
primarily as a characteristic of political systems (that may evolve over time, with 
institutional change or development), our new democracy results suggest a somewhat 
different view.  “Transparency” reflects experience with the elections themselves, with 
the crucial variable being the number of competitive elections a country has held (or, the 
length of time a country has been a democracy), rather than the level of democracy.  Our 
findings in Table 8, namely that the importance of the level of democracy in explaining 
the cycle may actually reflect the new democracy effect, suggest the importance of 
distinguishing the two.  A key implication of our view is that the signal content of fiscal 
actions necessarily changed over time as voters became more experienced over time with 
electoral fiscal manipulation and were provided with more economic and fiscal 
information in order to draw inferences.  This is certainly consistent with the findings of 
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2003) discussed at the beginning of this section.  Hence, 
any positive effect of deficit spending on an incumbent's electoral prospects would not 
only diminish over time, but would probably change sign as a country has more 
experience with a competitive electoral process.   
                                                 
24 The index is a product of the number of radios per capita and a binary variable of whether the 
country had freedom of broadcasting.    22
This last point brings us back to the relation between the theory of the 
opportunistic political business cycle, predicated on the view voters may reward deficit 
spending at the polls, and the view that voters may punish deficit spending at the polls.  
Our results for new democracies are consistent with the first view, while the findings for 
established democracies are consistent with the second.  Proponents of the latter view, 
such as Peltzman (1992) or Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) looked at established 
democracies, and it is not surprising that they do not find support for an electoral benefit 
of deficit spending.  Our new democracy result – and the view that there is a learning 
process which leads to the empirical disappearance of an aggregate political budget cycle 
– can reconcile and make consistent these two approaches.   
An implication of the argument that voters in established democracies may punish 
deficit spending is that opportunistic politicians will use fiscal policy to influence voters 
in ways that don’t increase the overall budget deficit.  This may be by changing the 
composition of expenditures in an election year in a way designed to get more votes, or, 
more specifically, by targeting particular groups of voters.  Drazen and Eslava (2004a) 
present a model of rational voter in the first case and present evidence on the importance 
of composition of spending effects for the political budget cycle in regional and 
municipal elections in Colombia.  In Drazen and Eslava (2004b), it is shown that when 
rational but imperfectly informed voters must infer whether they are targeted for election 
purposes are not, effective fiscal manipulation can take place without increasing the 
government budget deficit.  
 
7. Conclusions  
  In this paper we considered the empirical evidence for the existence of a political 
budget cycle.  The question of whether such a cycle exists on the macroeconomic level 
across countries turns out to be a question of where it exists, that is, in which types of 
countries.  The answer to that question is not only empirically relevant, but theoretically 
important as well, since it sheds light on what factors may account for the existence of a 
cycle.  
Our empirical results indicate that the political deficit cycle is a phenomenon of 
new democracies.  The strong political cycle in those countries, which is characterized by   23
increased expenditures in election years, accounts for the finding of a political deficit 
cycle in larger samples including these countries.  Once these countries are removed from 
the larger sample, the political deficit cycle in larger samples disappears.  Furthermore, 
our results indicate that empirical findings of stronger cycles in less-developed than 
developed countries, in countries with lower levels of democracy, or across government 
systems and electoral rules is driven by the experience of new democracies.  
This finding suggests that fiscal manipulation is used more broadly in “new” 
democracies, where it may “work” because of lack of experience with electoral politics or 
lack of information that is available in established democracies and used by experienced 
voters.  As models that view rational voters as “fiscal conservatives” suggest, once a 
country becomes experienced in electoral politics, the scope for a political fiscal cycle at 
the aggregate level should be diminished, perhaps significantly so.  
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Data Appendix 
Sample 
We use IFS data for all the countries with available central government data on the 
Deficit, Total Expenditure and Total Revenue (including Grants). Where IFS data are 
missing we tried to complement them by using GFS data or alternative sources. A 
detailed list of all the adjustments made to the data appears in Table A1. 
To restrict our sample only to democracies, we include only the observations with a non-
negative score in the POLITY IV Level of Democracy index, which is produced by the 
University of Maryland.  Hence, only data points with a score of 0 and above are left in 
the sample. 
In the former socialist economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we 
exclude the observations for the first two years after transition, as they may represent the 
simultaneous effect of the shift to democracy and the collapse of central planning, rather 
than political manipulation of fiscal variables. The elections in these countries which are 
included in the sample are listed in Table A2. 
 
Fiscal policy variables 
The dependent variables are the following: Balance- calculated as the difference between 
Total Revenue & Grants and Total Expenditure. Total Expenditure- taken from the IFS 
dataset. Total Revenue & Grants- calculated as Revenue plus Grants from the IFS 
dataset. 




The data on election years and dates, are mainly retrieved from the Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), "Voter Turnout Since 1945 to Date"  
(www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm). Additional sources are: The International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (www.ifes.org/eguide.elecguide.htm), The Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) Version 2000, (a project conducted by the World Bank) and are 
complemented by other political data sources. See also www.electionworld.org.    28
Our election year variable Elect- is a dummy variable that receives the value 1 in the 
election year and 0 otherwise. 
All our estimations contain fixed country effects, as well as one lag of the dependent 
variable.  Fixed year effects were tested and removed since they were not statistically 
significant and have not affected the main results. 
 
Economic control variables 
Trade- the share of international trade, as a percentage of GDP, taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2002 publication of the World Bank. 
Lgdp_pc - the log of real per-capita income. The data for 1975-2001 are taken directly 
from the WDI dataset (mentioned above). The data for the years 1960-1975 are computed 
using the WDI "GDP per capita in constant 1995 US$" series. 
Pop1564, Pop65 - Two demographic variables measuring the fraction of a country's 
population, ranging between 15 through 64, and above 65, respectively. 
Gdp_rhp - A measure of the output gap, calculated as the difference between real GDP 
and its (country specific) trend.  The trend was computed using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter on the change in real GDP.  Real GDP data were extracted from the WDI dataset in 
constant 1995 US$. 
 
Presidential Vs. Parliamentary constitutional rules 
The DPI database provides information whether the chief executive responsible for 
economic policy, in each country and in each election year, is elected directly by the 
public or by parliament.  In the former case we define the electoral rule as Presidential 
and in the latter as Parliamentary, as in Persson and Tabellini (2002).  Based on this 
distinction between the electoral rules we computed the following variables: 
Pres - receives the value 1 in a Presidential electoral system, and 0 otherwise. 
Parl - receives the value 1 in a Parliamentary electoral system, and 0 otherwise. 
Elect_pres - an interaction between Pres and Elect= (Pres)*(Elect). 
Elect_parl - an interaction between Parl and Elect= (Parl)*(Elect).   29
When estimating the Presidential vs. Parliamentary equation, we use both Elect_pres and 
Elect_parl variables, together with the economic control variables, and one lag of the 
dependent variable. 
 
Proportional vs. Majoritarian electoral rules 
The DPI database provides information, in each country and in each election year, 
whether candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their party. In 
this case they define the electoral system as Proportional representation and in the other 
case we define the electoral system as Majoritarian representation. Based on the 
distinction between the electoral systems we computed the following variables: 
Prop – receives the value 1 in a Proportional electoral system and 0 otherwise. 
Maj – receives the value 1 in a Majoritarian electoral system, and 0 otherwise. 
Elect-prop – an interaction between Prop and Elect = (prop)*(Elect) 
Elect-maj – an interaction between Maj and Elect = (Maj)*(Elect). 
  
Level of democracy 
The analysis regarding the level of democracy was based on the score of each country in 
the POLITY IV dataset. We split the sample between these countries with a score of 0 to 9 
and those with a score of 10, because more than 50 percent of the data points represent 
countries with a score of 10. Where the score changed during the covered period, we split 
the data points for that country according to the score in each year. 
 
Predetermined vs. Endogenous elections 
Based on www.electionworld.org data that indicate the frequency of elections country by 
country, we determined when the next elections should have been held. If the election 
were held in the expected year we classified them as predetermined; otherwise they were 
classified as endogenous. 
 Table 1: The Political Budget Cycle Across Countries, Fixed Effects Estimates
Estimation period
Dependent variable
1 balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect
2 -0.341*** 0.071 -0.263 -0.868*** 0.745** -0.159 -0.685** 0.435* -0.248 -0.092 -0.153 -0.239**
(0.123) (0.193) (0.170) (0.273) (0.292) (0.235) (0.289) (0.259) (0.247) (0.133) (0.143) (0.117)
Adjusted R
2 0.686 0.906 0.915 0.461 0.937 0.954 0.504 0.929 0.919 0.768 0.961 0.970
F- Statistic 48.79 213.58 240.88 9.46 151.34 204.55 11.68 141.63 119.85 97.301 714.91 944.86
DW Statistic 1.943 1.548 1.448 1.822 2.046 2.107 1.692 1.952 2.115 1.893 1.965 1.861
No. of countries 68 68 68 36 36 36 26 26 26 32 32 32
No. of obs. 1617 1632 1641 416 424 416 337 345 337 1105 1112 1128
Avg. time series length 23.8 24.0 24.1 11.6 11.8 11.6 13.0 13.3 13.0 34.5 34.8 35.3
2Elect - a dummy variable with the value 1 in the election year and 0 otherwise.






The covariates include one lag of the dependent variable, the log of per-capita GDP, the ratio of international trade to GDP, the fraction of the population over age 65, 
the fraction of the population between ages 15 and 64, and the log difference between real GDP and its (country specific) trend, estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.
3The "new democracies" among the transition economies are listed in Table A1.














2 balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect
3 -0.374*** 0.217  -0.140 -0.739*** 0.955*** 0.299 -0.687*** 0.592** -0.022 -0.191  -0.047 -0.223**
(0.109) (0.173) (0.148) (0.272) (0.339) (0.394) (0.259) (0.253) (0.346) (0.123) (0.142) (0.106)
Sargan test
4 0.001 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2
nd Order Test
5 0.557 0.815 0.040 0.665 0.961 0.328 0.725 0.521 0.694 0.504 0.903 0.572
No. of countries 68 68 68 36 36 36 26 26 26 32 32 32
No. of obs. 1445 1458 1469 339 347 339 280 288 280 1028 1033 1051
Avg. time series length 21.3 21.4 21.6 9.4 9.6 9.4 10.8 11.1 10.8 32.1 32.3 32.8
1Estimated using the Arellano-Bond procedure with two lags of the dependent variable. The covariates are as in table 1.
3Elect - a dummy variable with the value 1 in the election year and 0 otherwise.
4 P-values for rejecting the null hypothsis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals.
5 P-values for rejecting the null hypothsis that there is no second order serial correlationin the first-difference residuals.




2Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP):  balance-central government surplus;  texp-total expenditure by the central government;  trg-total revenue and grants of the 
central government.
1960-2001 1960-2001











2 balance texp trg
Elect_old
3 -0.100 -0.131 -0.223
(0.145) (0.228) (0.201)
Elect_ND1
4 -1.377** 0.751 -0.645
(0.543) (0.833) (0.762)
Elect_ND2
4 -0.816** 0.441 -0.434
(0.384) (0.590) (0.539)
Elect_ND3
4 -0.973** 0.842 0.071
(0.462) (0.729) (0.648)
Elect_ND4
4 -1.169* 0.090 -1.038
(0.635) (1.003) (0.892)
Elect_ND_LATER
4 -0.693 -0.180 -0.845
(0.608) (0.962) (0.854)
Adjusted R
2 0.687 0.906 0.915
F- Statistic 46.98 199.80 225.27
DW Statistic 1.945 1.545 1.452
No. of countries 68 68 68
No. of obs. 1617 1632 1641
3Elect_old - a dummy variable with the value 1 in the election year - only in old democracies - and 0 otherwise.





 For the list of covariates and variable definitions see Table 1.
4Dummy variables with the value of 1 in the election year of the first, second, third, fourth and later elections, respectively - 
only in new democracies - and 0 otherwise.
2Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP):  balance-central government surplus;  texp-total expenditure by the central 
government; trg-total revenue and grants of the central government.Table 4: The Political Budget Cycle in Developed and Less Developed Economies.
Estimation period
Dependent variable
3 balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect
4 -0.224* -0.081 -0.324 -0.072 -0.150 -0.237**
(0.121) (0.302) (0.275) (0.122) (0.139) (0.115)
Adjusted R
2 0.832 0.865 0.872 0.838 0.972 0.978
F- Statistic 136.02 175.91 189.58 144.91 985.45 1249.73
DW Statistic 1.842 1.281 1.234 1.775 1.844 1.849
No. of countries 24 24 24 20 20 20
No. of obs. 819 823 832 722 726 734
Avg. time series length 34.1 34.3 34.7 36.1 36.3 36.7
Estimation period
Dependent variable
3 balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect
4 -0.492** 0.260 -0.182 -0.846*** 0.658** -0.195 -0.665* 0.789** 0.038 -0.137 -0.170 -0.244
(0.215) (0.226) (0.185) (0.296) (0.321) (0.266) (0.361) (0.360) (0.328) (0.317) (0.331) (0.268)
Adjusted R
2 0.570 0.936 0.948 0.365 0.936 0.953 ... ... ... 0.689 0.938 0.947
F- Statistic 22.16 238.44 295.61 6.49 143.89 193.09 ... ... ... 47.98 323.85 388.09
DW Statistic 1.972 2.135 2.043 1.852 2.034 2.121 ... ... ... 1.965 2.077 1.873
Sargan test
5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... ... ...
2
nd Order Test
5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.893 0.601 0.937 ... ... ...
No. of countries 44 44 44 32 32 32 32 32 32 12 12 12
No. of obs. 798 809 809 365 373 365 296 304 296 383 386 394
Avg. time series length 18.1 18.4 18.4 11.4 11.7 11.4 9.3 9.5 9.3 31.9 32.2 32.8
The covariates are as in table 1.
1OECD Economies that were members of the organization during the entire sample period.
4Elect - a dummy variable with the value 1 in the election year and 0 otherwise.
5For the definitions of these tests see Table 2.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
1960-2001 1960-2001 1960-2001 1960-2001
(3) (5) (6)
Less Developed "New 
Democracies", FE Estimation
All Less Developed Economies, 
FE Estimation
Less Developed "New 
Democracies", GMM Estimation
2The "new democracies" among the developed economies are Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey.
3Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP):  balance-central government surplus;  texp-total expenditure by the central government;  trg-total revenue and grants of 












Less Developed "Old 
Democracies", FE Estimation
(4)Table 5: Predetermined vs. Endogenous Election Dates.
Estimation period
Dependent variable
2 balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect-pred
3 -0.294* -0.010 -0.308 -0.840*** 0.407 -0.429 -0.650** 0.487 0.028 -0.062 -0.224 -0.285**
(0.150) (0.235) (0.208) (0.325) (0.344) (0.279) (0.302) (0.356) (0.438) (0.164) (0.176) (0.143)
Elect-endog
4 -0.417** 0.204 -0.190 -0.930** 1.492*** 0.419 -0.894* 1.764*** 0.738 -0.138 -0.043 -0.166
(0.185) (0.293) (0.259) (0.467) (0.501) (0.401) (0.483) (0.578) (0.570) (0.198) (0.214) (0.175)
Adjusted R
2 0.686 0.906 0.915 0.460 0.938 0.954 ... ... ... 0.768 0.961 0.970
F- Statistic 48.13 210.65 237.54 9.22 148.82 201.03 ... ... ... 94.73 696.26 920.06
DW Statistic 1.943 1.548 1.448 1.822 2.035 2.103 ... ... ... 1.894 1.966 1.861
Sargan test
5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... ... ...
2
nd Order Test
5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.650 0.857 0.382 ... ... ...
No. of countries 68 68 68 36 36 36 36 36 36 32 32 32
No. of obs. 1617 1632 1641 416 424 416 339 347 339 1105 1112 1128
Avg. time series length 23.8 24.0 24.1 11.6 11.8 11.6 9.4 9.6 9.4 34.5 34.8 35.3
1Estimated using the Arellano-Bond procedure as described in table 1.
3Elect-pred - a dummy variable with the value 1 in an election year if the elections are in their predetermined dates, as defined in the text, and 0 otherwise.
5For the definitions of these tests see Table 2.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
1960-2001




4Elect-endog - a dummy variable with the value 1 in an election year if the elections are not in their predetermined dates, as defined in the text, and 0 otherwise.
2Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP):  balance-central government surplus;  texp-total expenditure by the central government;  trg-total revenue and grants of the








 "New Democracies", GMM
1 
Estimation
(3)Table 6: Constitutional Rules and the Political Budget Cycle
Estimation period
Dependent variable
2 balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect-pres
3 -0.395* 0.386 0.050 -0.850*** 0.755** -0.098 -0.684** 0.942** 0.374 0.172 -0.206 0.074
(0.218) (0.343) (0.301) (0.328) (0.354) (0.283) (0.324) (0.376) (0.447) (0.315) (0.339) (0.271)
Elect-parl
4 -0.317** -0.070 -0.407** -0.907* 0.724 -0.293 -0.877* 1.058* 0.109 -0.148 -0.141 -0.309**
(0.147) (0.231) (0.205) (0.482) (0.500) (0.415) (0.501) (0.642) (0.601) (0.146) (0.158) (0.129)
Adjusted R
2 0.686 0.906 0.915 0.460 0.937 0.954 ... ... ... 0.768 0.961 0.970
F- Statistic 48.12 210.78 237.78 9.22 147.44 199.34 ... ... ... 94.81 695.95 921.22
DW Statistic 1.943 1.548 1.449 1.822 2.046 2.109 ... ... ... 1.897 1.965 1.863
Sargan test
5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... ... ...
2
nd Order Test
5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.769 0.847 0.342 ... ... ...
No. of countries 68 68 68 36 36 36 36 36 36 32 32 32
No. of obs. 1617 1632 1641 416 424 416 339 347 339 1105 1112 1128
Avg. time series length 23.8 24.0 24.1 11.6 11.8 11.6 9.4 9.6 9.4 34.5 34.8 35.3
The covariates are as in table 1.
1Estimated using the Arellano-Bond procedure as described in table 1.
3Elect-pres - a dummy variable with the value 1 in an election year if system is presidential, and 0 otherwise.
4Elect-parl - a dummy variable with the value 1 in an election year if system is parlamentary, and 0 otherwise.
5For the definitions of these tests see Table 2.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
2Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP):  balance-central government surplus;  texp-total expenditure by the central government;  trg-total revenue and grants of 













Old Democracies, FE 
Estimation
(4)
1960-2001Table 7: Electoral Rules and the Political Budget Cycle
Estimation period
Dependent variable
2 balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect-prop
3 -0.339** 0.093 -0.221 -0.995*** 0.908*** -0.036 -0.840*** 1.168*** 0.475 -0.067 -0.148 -0.200
(0.140) (0.220) (0.195) (0.305) (0.325) (0.263) (0.283) (0.383) (0.424) (0.153) (0.165) (0.135)
Elect-maj
4 -0.340 -0.003 -0.401 -0.356 0.074 -0.652 -0.332 0.207 -0.766 -0.168 -0.167 -0.355
(0.254) (0.400) (0.349) (0.613) (0.658) (0.528) (0.609) (0.677) (0.664) 0.264 (0.285) (0.229)
Adjusted R
2 0.686 0.906 0.915 0.461 0.937 0.954 ... ... ... 0.768 0.961 0.970
F- Statistic 48.11 210.60 237.55 9.258 147.97 199.86 ... ... ... 94.73 695.94 920.09
DW Statistic 1.943 1.548 1.447 1.819 2.040 2.105 ... ... ... 1.894 1.965 1.860
Sargan test
5 … ... ... ... ... ... 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... ... ...
2
nd Order Test
5 … ... ... ... ... ... 0.791 0.917 0.467 ... ... ...
No. of countries 68 68 68 36 36 36 36 36 36 32 32 32
No. of obs. 1617 1632 1641 416 424 416 339 347 339 1105 1112 1128
Avg. time series length 23.8 24.0 24.1 11.6 11.8 11.6 9.4 9.6 9.4 34.5 34.8 35.3
The covariates are as in table 1.
1Estimated using the Arellano-Bond procedure as described in table 1.
3Elect-prop - a dummy variable with the value 1 in an election year if the electoral system is proportional, and 0 otherwise.
4Elect-maj - a dummy variable with the value 1 in an election year if the electoral system is majoritarian, and 0 otherwise.
5For the definitions of these tests see Table 2.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
2Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP):  balance-central government surplus;  texp-total expenditure by the central government;  trg-total revenue and grants of 
















1960-2001Table 8: The Effect of the Level of Democracy on the Political Budget Cycle.
Estimation period
Dependent variable
2 balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg balance texp trg
Elect-low
3 -0.634*** 0.364 -0.230 -0.783*** 0.607* -0.265 -0.736** 0.855** 0.198 -0.255 -0.196 -0.353
(0.193) (0.303) (0.266) (0.300) (0.319) (0.258) (0.311) (0.354) (0.424) (0.273) (0.294) (0.232)
Elect-high
4 -0.150 -0.122 -0.286 -1.264** 1.401** -(0.336) -0.735 1.394* 0.721 -0.042 -0.139 -0.201
(0.157) (0.247) (0.220) (0.636) (0.686) (0.548) (0.554) (0.756) (0.751) (0.152) (0.163) (0.134)
Adjusted R
2 0.687 0.906 0.915 0.461 0.937 0.954 ... ... ... 0.768 0.961 0.970
F- Statistic 48.28 210.83 237.52 9.24 147.90 199.81 ... ... ... 94.77 695.95 920.07
DW Statistic 1.942 1.549 1.448 1.826 2.043 2.103 ... ... ... 1.893 1.965 1.860
Sargan test
5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... ... ...
2
nd Order Test
5 ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.705 0.943 0.324 ... ... ...
No. of countries 68 68 68 36 36 36 36 36 36 32 32 32
No. of obs. 1617 1632 1641 416 424 416 339 347 339 1105 1112 1128
Avg. time series length 23.8 24.0 24.1 11.6 11.8 11.6 9.4 9.6 9.4 34.5 34.8 35.3
The covariates are as in table 1.
1Estimated using the Arellano-Bond procedure as described in table 1.
3Elect-low - a dummy variable with the value 1 in an election year if the level of democracy is between 0 and 9, and 0 otherwise.
4Elect-high - a dummy variable with the value 1 if the level of democracy is 10, and 0 otherwise.
5For the definitions of these tests see Table 2.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.




2Variable definitions (all in percent of GDP): balance-central government surplus; texp-total expenditure by the central government; trg-total revenue and 












1960-2001Table 9: Alternative Timing of the Budget Cycle.
Estimation period
Dependent variable All Democracies New Democracies Old Democracies
Elect-half1
2 -0.150 -0.448 0.058
(0.164) (0.386) (0.177)
Elect-half2
3 -0.537*** -1.233*** -0.252
(0.166) (0.362) (0.181)
Adjusted R
2 0.687 0.463 0.768
F- Statistic 48.249 9.329 94.909
DW Statistic 1.944 1.814 1.896
No. of countries 68 36 32
No. of obs. 1617 416 1105
Avg. time series length 23.8 11.6 34.5
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
2Elect-half1 - a dummy variable with the value 1 in an election year if the elections are in the first half of the year, 
and 0 otherwise.





















1 Argentina 1973-75, 
1983-2001
1983-2000 x Fiscal data not available for 1973-1975. 
The change in real GDP for 1991 and 1992 
is calculated from IFS 2003.
3
2 Australia 1960-2001 1960-2000 x The change in real GDP for 1968 is 
calculated from IFS. 
16
3 Austria 1960-2001 1960-99 x 13
4 Belgium 1960-2001 1960-98 x 12
5 Bolivia 1982-2001 1985-2000 x3
6 Brazil 1960-63, 
1985-2001
1985-98 x3
7 Bulgaria 1990-2001 1990-2000 x2
8 Canada 1960-2001 1960-2000 x Real GDP and population data for 1960-
1965 and trade data for 1960-64 and 2000, 
calculated from IFS (the 2000 data from 
IFS 2003).
12
9 Chile 1960-72, 
1989-2001
1989-2000 x2
10 Colombia 1960-2001 1971-2000 7
11 Costa-Rica 1960-2001 1972-99 7
12 Cyprus 1960-62, 
1968-2001
1975-2001 The Greek part of Cyprus. 5
13 Czech Republic 1990-2001 1993-2000 x2
14 Denmark 1960-2000 1960-99 x 15
15 Dominican Republic 1963,     1978-
2001
1978-2000 x 4+2




17 El Salvador 1964-70, 
1984-2001
1984-2000 x3
18 Estonia 1991-2001 1991-2000 x3





20 Finland 1960-2001 1960-98 x 10
21 France 1960-2001 1972-97 x 7
A gap in the IFS data in 1998 was bridged using 
differences from the IMF staff report data.
Missing revenue data for 1968-1971 were bridged by 
using differences from OECD data.
2001, IMF staff report
A break in the series in 1970 was bridged using the 
differences calculated from OECD data.
Data prior to 1973 are unreliable and excluded.
Expenditure data: 1971-1993 - GFS (IFS data not 
available).
Revenue: 1972-1999 - GFS; IFS revenue data is not 
comparable with expenditure data. Expenditure: 70-2000
There is a break in the Series in 1970. It was bridged by 
using the difference from the OECD dataset.
1988-1991 - GFS. 1982-1984 are excluded because the 
revenue data are not conssistent with the following years
1998 - GFS. Data for 1995-96 missing
Table A1: Sample Characteristics and data adjustments
Years not using IFS - and description of the 
adjustments to the fiscal data
 IFS data for years before 1995 are missing; GFS data 
were used.Since GFS data are presented as an index. 
1978 was used as a base year, 
1998-99 GFS, 2000 IMF staff report
1999 - GFS. There are breaks in the IFS series in 1970, 
1980 and 1990. These were bridged by using differences 















Years not using IFS - and description of the 
adjustments to the fiscal data
22 Germany 1960-2001 1960-98 x West Germany until 1990. GDP data prior 
to 1972 were calculated from IFS 2003. 
Trade data prior to 1972 are not available.
11
23 Greece 1960-66, 
1975-2001
1960-98 x x 4+4





25 Honduras 1982-2001 1990-2000 x2
26 Hungury 1990-2001 1990-2000 x2
27 Iceland 1960-2001 1972-2000 x Trade data for 2000 were calculated from 
IFS 2003.
8
28 India 1960-2001 1960-2000 8
29 Ireland 1960-2001 1960-98 x 11
30 Israel 1960-2001 1960-1999 10
31 Italy 1960-2001 1960-98 x 10
32 Japan 1960-2001 1970-93 x 8






34 Lithuania 1991-2001 1993-2000 x1
35 Luxembourg 1960-2001 1970-74, 
1976-97
x5
36 Madagascar 1992-2001 1992-2000 x2
37 Malaysia 1960-2001 1960-99 9
38 Mali 1992-2001 1992-2000 x1
39 Mauritius 1968-2001 1968-2000 Democratic elections took place since 
1958 - before independence.
6
40 Mexico 1988-2001 1980-2000 x2
41 Nepal 1990-2001 1990-99 x4
42 Netherlands 1960-2001 1960-98 x 12
43 New zealand 1960-2001 1960-2000 x Trade data for 1960-72 and 2000 are taken 
from IFS 2003.
12
44 Nicaragua 1990-2001 1988-2000 x GDP and trade data were calculated from 
IFS 2003.
1
A break in 1970 was bridged using differences from 
OECD data.
1994-1998 - GFS, due to extra-ordinary expenditure data - 
reflecting accounting adjustments.GDP was revised in 
1988: GDP for 1975-1987 was multiplied by 1.23 to be 
consistent with the revised level. The 1982 expenditure 
figure was corrected using GFS.
IFS data not available. GFS was used.
1973, 1985 excluded due to war and hyper-inflation, 
respectively.The 1991 budget figures are multiplied by 
1.33 to account for the 9 month fiscal year.
1975 - a break in the series.1970-72 GFS data.















Years not using IFS - and description of the 
adjustments to the fiscal data
45 Norway 1960-2001 1960-98 x 10





x The period before 1973 was excluded 
because Pakistan included Bengaladesh.
3




x Trade data for 1960-67 are taken from IFS 
2003.
2+1
48 Papua new Guinie 1975-2001 1975-99 Elections took place before complete 
independence in 1975.
6
49 Paraguay 1989-2001 1986-2000 x GDP and trade data were calculated from 
IFS 2003.
2
50 Peru 1960-67, 
1980-99
1986-2000 x 1992 is included - despite a negative Polity 
garde - to avoid a break in the series.
2





52 Poland 1989-2001 1991-2000 x2
53 Portugal 1976-2001 1970-98 x x 4+2
54 Romania 1990-2001 1990-99 x2
55 Russia 1992-2001 1995-2000 x2
56 Slovak Republic 1993-2001 1994-2000 x1
57 Slovenia 1991-2001 1993-2001 x2
58 South Africa 1960-91, 
1994-2001
1960-2000 9
59 Spain 1978-2001 1978-99 x x 4+2
60 Sri Lanka 1960-2001 1960-2000 7
61 Sweden 1960-2001 1960-2000 x There are substantial breaks in the series 
in the early 1990s.
13
62 Switzerland 1960-2001 1960-2000 x Trade data for 2000 were calculated from 
IFS 2003
10










x x Previous periods excluded due to lack of 
data and shortness of sample period.
3+2
65 United Kindom 1960-2001 1960-1999 x 9
66 United States 1960-2001 1960-2000 x Trade data for 2000 were calculated from 
IFS 2003
10
67 Uruguay 1960-70, 
1985-2001
1985-2000 x3
68 Venezuela 1960-2001 1960-2000 8
1The figure after a + sign indicates the number of elections that took place in a country which is defined as a "new democracy" during years in which it was not a "new democracy".
A break in the fiscal series in 1972 is bridged by using 
differences from OECD data.
Fiscal data for 1991-1993 were calculated on the basis of 
differences from OECD data.
1994 and 1995 data were calculated by using differences 
from OECD data.
1999 was calculated by using differences from OECD 
data.No. Country
1 Argentina 1983 89, 95, 99
2 Bolivia 1982 89, 93, 97
3 Brazil 1985 89, 94, 98
4 Bulgaria 1990 92, 96 x
5 Chile 1989 93, 00 x
6 Czech Republic 1990 96, 98
7 Dominican Republic 1978  82, 86, 90, 94
8 Ecuador 1979 84, 88, 92, 96
9 El Salvador 1984 89, 94, 99
10 Estonia 1991 92, 95, 99 x
11 Fiji 1970, 1990 73, 77, 82, 92, 99
12 Greece 1975 77, 81, 85, 89
13 Guatemala 1966, 1986 70, 90,95, 99
14 Honduras 1982 85 
2, 89 
2, 93, 97
15 Hungary 1990 94, 98 x
16 Korea 1988 92, 97
17 Lithuania 1991 97 x
18 Madagascar 1992 93, 96
19 Mali 1992 97
20 Mexico 1988 94, 00
21 Nepal 1990 91, 95, 97, 99
22 Nicaragua 1990 96
23 Pakistan 1988 91, 94, 97
24 Panama 1989 94, 99
25 Paraguay 1989  93, 98
26 Peru 1980 90, 95
27 Philipines 1987 92, 95, 98
28 Poland 1989 95, 00 x
29 Portugal 1976 80, 83, 85, 87
30 Romania 1990 92, 96 x
31 Russia 1992 96, 00 x
32 Slovak Republic 1993 98 x
33 Slovenia 1991 96, 00 x
34 Spain 1978 79, 82, 86, 89
35 Turkey 1983 87, 91, 95
36 Uruguay 1985 89, 94, 99
"Transition" 
Economy
Table A2: The "New Democracies"
Elections Included as a "New 
Democracy"
Source: Calculations based on the POLITY IV dataset, produced by the University of 
Maryland, and the World Bank Database on Political Institutions.
Year of Becoming a 
Democracy
1
1The first year in which the country receives a positive value in the POLITY scale, 
following a substantial period of negative values. The actual transition (e.g., first 
democratic elections) can take place during the previous year.
2Expenditure only.No. Country
Years With 
Positive Polity Reason for exclusion
1 Bahamas,The no polity No POLITY rank
2 Bangladesh 72-73,91-2001 No fiscal data in IFS.
3 Barbados no polity No POLITY rank
4 Belarus 1991-1995 Available sample too short.
5 Belize no polity No POLITY rank
6 Bostwana 1966-2001 Extra-ordinary changes in the series.
7 Burkina Faso 78-79 Only two years with positive POLITY rank
8 Burundi all negative Negative POLITY rank throuout the sample period.
9 Cameroon all negative Negative POLITY rank throuout the sample period.
10 Chad all negative Negative POLITY rank throuout the sample period.
11 Congo 60-62,92-96 Sample too short
12 Croatia 2000 Sample too short
13 Egypt, Arab Rep. all negative Negative POLITY rank throuout the sample period.
14 Gambia, The 65-93 No fiscal data in IFS.
15 Ghana 70-71,79-80,96-2001 No fiscal data in IFS.
16 Guyana 1966-79, 1992-2001 Available periods too short, due to low quality data.
17 Indonesia 1999-2001 Sample too short
18 Iran 1997-2001 Sample too short
19 Jamaica 1960-2001 No fiscal data in IFS.
20 Kenya 1963-1968 Sample too short
21 Latvia 1991-2001 Sample too short
22 Liberia 1997-2001 Sample too short
23 Malawi 1994-2001 Sample with IFS data too short
24 Maldives no polity No POLITY rank
25 Malta no polity No POLITY rank
26 Nigeria 60-65,79-83,99-2001 Each democratic episode is too short.
27 Senegal 2000-2001 Sample too short
28 Siera Leone 61-66,68-70,97 Each democratic episode is too short.
29 Singapore 1960-1962 Sample too short
30 Solomon Islands no polity No POLITY rank
31 St.Lucia no polity No POLITY rank
32 Suriname no polity No POLITY rank
33 Syrian, Arab Rep all negative Negative POLITY rank throuout the sample period.
34 Thialand 69-70,74-75,78-
90,92-2001
Too many breaks in the periods of democracy.
35 Togo all negative Negative POLITY rank throuout the sample period.
36 Tunisia all negative Negative POLITY rank throuout the sample period.
37 Zambia 64-71,91-2001 Extra-ordinary changes in the series.
38 Zimbabwe 70-78,80-86 Available periods too short.
1Countries that appear in the IFS or that were used in other studies.
Table A3: Countries excluded from the sample
1Table A4: Election Years According to Various Classifications
All Democracies New Democracies Old Democracies
Elections
1 413 94 300
Of which:
    Developed countries 239 15 214
    Less developed countries 174 79 86
    Of which:
        Transition countries 19 19 0
Predetermined elections 252 63 180
Endogeneous elections 161 31 120
Elections in Presidential systems 122 63 49
Elections in Parliamentary systems 291 31 251
Proportional elections
2 318 75 229
Majoritarian elections
2 91 19 71
High level of democracy 257 17 234
Low level of democracy 156 77 66
1 The number of election years in "new" and "old" democracies does not add-up to the total number of 
election years because elections that took place in "new" democracies after the fourth elections are excluded 
from both samples but are included in the "all democracies" sample.
2 The number of proportional and majoritarian elections does not add-up to the total number of elections 
because the elections in Panama in 1964 and in the Philipines in 1961, 1967 and 1969 were not classifies as 
either in the DPI. 